

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

11 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 11 April 1969

5X1 DD/I reported that [redacted] will be visiting Chicago, Seattle, and San Francisco to meet with various China scholars.

DD/I noted that he has prepared a wrap-up memorandum on various U. S. commitments made with respect to disarmament negotiations and related inspections.

Godfrey reported that there are rumors and threats of a second Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. He reported that our charge in Prague sees little chance of a military coup [redacted]

5X1 [redacted] He speculated that the Soviets have enough military presence in Czechoslovakia at the moment to handle any emerging situation.

Godfrey noted that Tay Ninh and Vinh Long were subjected to severe Communist shelling last night.

DD/S reported that Northern Virginia College is being established in Annandale and has offered positions to CIA retirees. Seven files have been provided to date. This item provoked a lengthy discussion on the turbulent academic scene, in which the DD/I noted that [redacted] of OCI has been subjected to some past abuse at Harvard. The Director called attention to the item in today's Washington Post which mentions a Harvard faculty memorandum concerning Agency links with Harvard's Russian Research Center. D/ONE observed that all Agency mail to BNE consultants is sent to their homes. DD/P called attention to the item on "American Militarism" contained in the 12 April issue of The New Republic, and the Director indicated that he had read it and found it a great distortion. He encouraged others to read it.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

Maury related that he called Senator Cooper's office and found that they were unaware of any desire by the Senator for a briefing here on Soviet military capabilities. (See yesterday's item on Bill Miller's initiative in seeking a briefing.)

Maury noted that yesterday's scheduled briefing of Congressman Hosmer on the Soviet ABM problem was canceled.

Maury noted that, as suspected, the Joseph Young item on the Ervin bill in the 8 April Washington Star was a complete misrepresentation of the Civil Service Commission position. He observed that the Commission is now working on the House version of the bill.

25X

The Director alerted the Executive Director and the DD/S to the contingency that DOD may take some legal exception to our providing M-16 rifles to non-MAP recipients, namely, Meo leader Vang Pao in Laos.

The Director briefly noted the NSC meetings on NATO and foreign trade.

[Redacted Signature]

L. K. White

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12 April 1969

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American Militarism

General David M. Shoup, former Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, has set forth his views on "The New American Militarism" in the April issue of the *Atlantic*. His statement, somewhat reminiscent of the warning sounded by President Eisenhower against the power of the Military-Industry Combine and coming as it does at the peak of the ABM debates, has stirred up considerable comment. Shoup's message is that "the cult of the gun" is ready to lead us into war whenever and wherever the cultists "suspect Communist aggression." The obvious index of the military's ballooning influence is, of course, the Defense budget itself—\$45.5 billion in 1960, when General Shoup became Marine Corps Commandant; over \$82 billion ten years later. But the momentous meaning of Shoup's essay lies elsewhere, in what he does not say, in what he did not know how to say, in what he seems not to have observed.

General Shoup, who retired in December 1963 as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, never made the New Team that has been riding high this decade. With his Congressional Medal of Honor and his quiet dignity he was one of the old school. Like the other Chiefs of Staff of his time—Lemnitzer, White, Burke and Decker—he was battle-trained, competent, old-line. His and their era came to an end with the change of Administration in 1961, and specifically with the abortive invasion of Cuba. Shoup was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the Bay of Pigs, as was General Lemnitzer, but they never participated in its planning. The invasion cast the peacetime military forces in a role for which they were unprepared. When it misfired, some believed, or hoped, that CIA-directed paramilitary operations would be shelved, that a lesson had been learned and firm restraints placed on the gung-ho enthusiasts for counter-insurgency. They were wrong. In the wake of the disaster, President Kennedy appointed a review board (Allen Dulles, Admiral Burke, Robert Kennedy, and Maxwell Taylor). General Taylor, who had left the Army to vent his displeasure with things as they were and to write *The Uncertain Trumpet*, here found an outlet for his energies. When the Bay of Pigs hearings were concluded, President Kennedy made Taylor his Special Assistant and Adviser for Military matters. Both the young President and the ambitious general denied that this assignment would infringe upon the authority of the Chair-

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But the insiders knew better, knew General Taylor, knew he was more a CIA-type operator than an old-school military man. At Fort Bragg's Special Forces Center and in the new Air Cavalry Mobile Divisions at Fort Benning, the new forces began to be formed.

From his position close to the throne, General Taylor rapidly cemented relations between the CIA and elements of the Army. General Marshall S. Carter (Army) replaced General Charles B. Cabell (Air Force) as deputy director, Central Intelligence. John McCone replaced the old master, Allen Dulles, as director. The Army was drastically reoriented; "Green Berets" and Air Cavalry units ascended to prominence over conventional forces. A large number of US Army Special Forces officers were on special assignment with the CIA. As had had assignments with that agency. Many

CIA officials were serving in the Defense Department in both military and civilian roles. General Taylor took over as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lemnitzer having completed his tour. The man who had stepped down from the Army in a huff was back, bigger than life and in the number one job. The Army-CIA example spread like wildfire. The Air Force rushed to create its own Special Air Warfare units from assorted remnants of the Bay of Pigs resources. The Navy created its own version of Special Warfare units in its SEAL teams and others. With General Taylor it was "Get on the Team" or get left behind. The new President and his brother had embraced the concept of counterinsurgency; the New Team was ready to meet the challenge.

General Shoup and the Marines were not on that team. Although the regular military forces had the highest regard for the Marines as experts in Special Warfare, the Army-CIA enthusiasts passed them by. The emerging team prided itself on its readiness to perform anywhere in the world, "wherever and whenever we suspect Communist aggression," as General Shoup says. To repeat, the vital force in the new militarism was not the traditional military. It was not they who spearheaded the "massive and swift invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965," to which Shoup refers in his *Atlantic* article. It was the CIA-Special Forces elements which opened the door, and were then followed by the regular military, after basic decisions had been made. Even the Marine colonel who opened early contacts with Dominican officials in Washington and later in the Dominican Republic, was working with and through the CIA representatives, not with the military.

CIA, as used in this connection, is the operational organization, not the intelligence structure, and the operational organization was and is well-placed throughout the government. Farsighted Army officers years ago saw the value of travelling the CIA route for contacts, special techniques, and the mystique that went with working in the backrooms of military activities. Lt. Gen. William E. De Puy, assistant vice chief of staff, first served with CIA as a deputy division chief in 1950 and 1951; Lt. Gen. W. Raymond Peers was chief of CIA clandestine training in 1949 and the head of Western Enterprises, a CIA cover, in Taiwan from 1951 through 1953. Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy started out in CIA on the intelligence side, wandered over to Defense, then to State, where his specialized training was put to use. Robert Komer went from CIA to the White House, then to Vietnam as an Ambassador in charge of "pacification." The decision makers on the New Team today

are not necessarily members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or residents of the Pentagon. They are at the White House on the Approve For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP80R01284A001800090097-3 in the CIA, perhaps in State, wherever the power gravitates. In the days of Arthur Goldberg, they were to be found in the Labor Department too.

The deepening involvement in Vietnam was part of the scenario. Until very recently, the US ambassador to South Vietnam was key man in all policy making, military and political. Recall the eminence there of Ambassadors Nolting, Lodge and Taylor. The generals, Harkins and Westmoreland, were responsible to the ambassador. That arrangement was necessary, because another US Government agency, the CIA, was in many ways as influential in Vietnam as the military from 1955 through 1963. The ambassador was the channel for transmitting decisions affecting the military and the CIA. The "cult of the gun" of which General Shoup now speaks was the cult of this New Team, and it played the dominant role in "steering us into the tragic military and political morass of Vietnam."

There are other examples of the New Team's enterprise. When serious border troubles broke out along the northern frontiers of India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan in 1962, an old soldier, General Paul Adams, founder and commanding general of the US Strike Command, headed a US military mission that made an urgent visit to New Delhi. In the last analysis, however, the CIA team, practically ignoring Ambassador Galbraith and General Adams, had things their way. The Indian police were trained under CIA, not US military direction, but were supported with US military equipment and manpower, among them many Special Forces troops.

In Laos in 1962, the CIA was again in control, using Army and Air Force elements in considerable strength as it saw fit. That unproductive intervention, "Dick Bissel's War" it was called, then moved lock, stock and barrel into Vietnam, by which time the campaign was well staffed with civilian/military veterans from Greece, Iran, Guatemala, India, Laos and other paramilitary zones of action. A review of the cast of characters in the early days in Saigon would have turned up the same principals who had been with Ambassador Lodge and General Van Fleet in Greece, with election advisers for President Magsaysay in the Philippines, with the Dalai Lama in Tibet, with the U-2 all over the world, and with the fledgling "Green Beret" factory at Fort Bragg.

This ultra-powerful, paramilitary joint venture within our government is now dominant. That is what General Shoup does not say. It can and did direct the movement of troops in the Dominican Republic without the restraints and caution normal to the officials of State and Defense; it thrust into that small country a force much larger than required or reasonable. This power and freedom to move large forces quickly without the usual review by proper authority resulted in the first entry of troops and equipment into South Vietnam in the early sixties. The Marine Corps and the Air Force objected at the time to the oversize

movement of helicopters into Vietnam, when the Vietnamese could not operate or support them. They went anyway, causing a large and unwarranted buildup of troop strength, ostensibly present to help the Vietnamese fly helicopters. The US was up to its neck before it knew it; then it was too late. Once the CIA-directed first step has been taken, elements of the military forces vie with each other in playing the game, as in the Bay of Pigs, or the Congo, from which the US barely extricated itself. The same can happen any time in the Middle East, Asia, or Latin America.

Courtesy of General Eisenhower and General Shoup, a corner of the rug has been lifted. What is hidden is more ominous than what is seen. "The New American Militarism" is not the most apt description of the forces at work. This is a new form of energy, which sets off major impulses through deft and adroit maneuvering. The maneuvering goes on at a level above the Cabinet and under a cloak of security, precluding that interplay and balance which we thought were embodied in our form of government, and it is buttressed, as General Shoup states, by a "relationship between the defense industry and the military establishment," which together "form a powerful public-opinion lobby."

Here is the subject for the Great Debate this year and next in the Congress and in the country.

Strike at Harvard Voted After Raid

By Eric Wentworth
Washington Post Staff Writer

CAMBRIDGE, Mass., April 10—More than 1000 irate student moderates joined forces with Harvard radicals and endorsed a three-day strike today, following a dawn police raid on the campus.

Police summoned by Harvard President Nathan M. Pusey and his top aides arrested nearly 200 student mili-

tants who had been occupying University Hall in the center of historic Harvard Yard since noon yesterday. Forty-five students were reportedly injured seriously enough to require treatment at hospitals.

Most of those arrested and injured were members of the radical Students for a Democratic Society. But campus moderates, who jammed the Yard's Memorial Church today for roughly four hours of emotional debate, voted to boycott classes for three days and challenged the University administration with a series of strong demands.

A number of Harvard Law School students were also reported to have voted a strike.

Tonight several hundred students at an SDS rally in Memorial Church laid plans to surround and picket Sever Hall, a large classroom building opposite University Hall, during class hours Friday.

Some 400 then marched to President Pusey's house and rallied there, chanting "On strike, shut it down," and "Pusey must go."

With the moderates planning to meet again Monday night to chart their future course, tension at Harvard was high. President Pusey faced undoubtedly the worst crisis of his 15-year tenure.

See HARVARD, A6, Col. 4

Harvard Students Vote Strike After Police Rout Radicals

HARVARD, From A1

The police "bust" to clear out University Hall, the main administration building, was the catalyst for the moderates' rage. While occupation of the building had been engineered by SDS to promote ostensibly limited and specific demands, the moderates drew up a larger list of grievances.

"We condemn the administration for its unnecessary use of police and condemn the police for their brutality," the Memorial Church moderates asserted in one resolution. "Furthermore, we call for a legal investigation of the police action, and we demand that police not be brought onto the campus again."

In a second resolution, certain to be crucial to chances for restoring calm tempers in the days ahead, the Memorial Church group demanded that all criminal charges against the arrested students be dropped, and that the University administration refrain from suspending or expelling them or withdrawing scholarship aid.

They called for Pusey's removal if he does not meet these and their other demands.

SDS activists—those who weren't in jail—staged a rival meeting outdoors. They reiterated their list of six non-negotiable demands involving ROTC programs and the University's local real estate activities.

They called on Harvard to abolish Army, Navy and Air Force officer training programs, to replace ROTC scholarships with regular scholarships, and to refrain from tearing down residential buildings in slum neighborhoods to make way for new Harvard structures.

Pusey issued a statement Wednesday evening claiming the SDS demands "have no basis in fact."

Pusey said that University officials were reviewing various aspects of the ROTC program. As for real estate, he contended Harvard rental rates were below the general market and added there were no plans to tear down residences in areas specified by the student militants.

Inside University Hall, the original occupiers and others who joined them made speeches, debated major and minor issues, did homework, picnicked, sang, played radios and eventually, after midnight, slept on the floor after appointing relays of sentries. Some browsed through confidential files, but evidently did little, if any, damage.

It was learned later that one student had gained access to a faculty memo concerning links between Harvard's Russian Research Center and the Central Intelligence Agency and British Intelligence.

The police raid came as no surprise. The students speculated all evening on when it would occur, saying they would meet it with "nonviolent obstructionist" tactics. Already, Dean Franklin Ford of the Arts and Sciences faculty, ejected earlier in the day, had announced ominously at 4 p.m. Wednesday that the Yard, which includes libraries, classroom and administration buildings and freshman dormitories, would be sealed off to upperclassmen. He gave the occupiers 15 minutes to leave University Hall or face arrest for trespassing.

When the first of some 400 state and local police rolled into the yard in a serpentine motorcade of cars, patrol wagons and chartered buses under a slate-blue dawn sky at 4:55 a.m., the students were ready. They had torn up sheets for makeshift tear-gas masks, and jotted down a Legal Aid Society phone number—some writing it with ballpoint pens on the backs of their hands.

A solid phalanx of about 50 students stood in front of each door of the building, chanting "ROTC must go." Platoons of policemen, wearing helmets and armed with nightsticks, deployed about the building. One group carried shields.

Though the deployment was orderly, the assault moments later produced mass confusion. First the police charged into the students in front of the building and spectators nearby, prodding or clubbing many with their wooden truncheons. Timothy H. S. Venn, a Boston freshman, was pushed from his wheelchair. "I don't believe the police have any right to come in here smashing heads when it's an internal affair," he said during the SDS rally later.

Fred Glimp, dean of Harvard College, took a bullhorn to warn those still inside the building they would have five minutes to evacuate. But very few heard him, and well before that time was up hefty state policemen had battered their way inside and rounded up the remaining demonstrators as well as some 15 student and visiting journalists. There was more bloodshed, and police used a gas in small quantities that some students identified as Mace.

The police herded the demonstrators and journalists into patrol wagons and buses, and whisked them away to two court buildings elsewhere in Cambridge, where they were jammed into detention cells to await the lengthy formalities.

At one jail an injured student was offered quick medical treatment, but several at the other, in the Third District Court of Eastern Middlesex County courthouse, had to wait nearly three hours to be treated.

The police assault, and stories of the violence, which waxed increasingly dramatic as they spread by word of mouth, stirred large numbers of students to protest.

One Navy ROTC member and self-described moderate, junior John McLoughlin from Princeton, N.J., said, "I just think many students feel like I do—that it could have been done in a more moderate way."

Most students arrested were booked on trespassing charges that carry a maximum \$25 fine, though a few were reported facing more serious



Associated Press

A student shields himself as he is hustled from hall.

charges, including assault and battery and at least one of possessing marijuana.

At least one veteran University official foresaw the amnesty question as threatening divisions within the teaching faculty and administration which could confront Pusey with a crisis of confidence.

The decision to call in the

police was bound to be risky and controversial. No immediate detailed official rationale was forthcoming from the administration, though the Harvard Crimson, student newspaper, quoted President Pusey as saying, "It became clear in the course of the evening that the only possible alternative was to take no action at all."